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CAUSATION’S NUCLEAR FUTURE: 
APPLYING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 
TO THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
WILLIAM D. O’CONNELL† 
ABSTRACT 
  For more than a quarter century, public discourse has pushed the 
nuclear-power industry in the direction of heavier regulation and 
greater scrutiny, effectively halting construction of new reactors. By 
focusing on contemporary fear of significant accidents, such discourse 
begs the question of what the nation’s court system would actually do 
should a major nuclear incident cause radiation-induced cancers. 
  Congress’s attempt to answer that question is the Price-Anderson 
Act, a broad statute addressing claims by the victims of a major 
nuclear accident. Lower courts interpreting the Act have repeatedly 
encountered a major stumbling block: it declares that judges must 
apply the antediluvian preponderance-of-the-evidence logic of state 
tort law, even though radiation science insists that the causes of 
radiation-induced cancers are more complex. After a major nuclear 
accident, the Act’s paradoxically outdated rules for adjudicating 
“causation” would make post-incident compensation unworkable. 
  This Note urges that nuclear-power-plant liability should not turn 
on eighteenth-century tort law. Drawing on modern scientific 
conclusions regarding the invariably “statistical” nature of cancer, this 
Note suggests a unitary federal standard for the Price-Anderson 
Act—that a defendant be deemed to have “caused” a plaintiff’s injury 
in direct proportion to the increased risk of harm the defendant has 
imposed. This “proportional liability” rule would not only fairly 
evaluate the costs borne by injured plaintiffs and protect a 
reawakening nuclear industry from the prospect of bank-breaking 
litigation, but would prove workable with only minor changes to the 
Price-Anderson Act’s standards of “injury” and “fault.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the past several decades, an effective moratorium on 
building new nuclear-power plants has silenced the nuclear industry.1 
The reasons for the halt in construction have included public outrage 
over the Three Mile Island meltdown,2 increasing regulation,3 and 
nuclear-power-plant operators’ need to insure against a multiplicity of 
risks.4 Although the potential harms that the nuclear industry poses to 
the public are often emphasized, the harmful uncertainty plaguing 
investment in nuclear power is not. Today, nuclear power is 
constantly beset by numerous unanticipated risks that it helped to 
create, including constant media attention5 and the variable and 
significant costs of building and maintaining nuclear-power plants.6 
Insuring against such risks has long been an immense cost of 
participating in the nuclear industry. 
 
 1. Justin Gundlach, Note, What’s the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant? The Answer’s 
Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New Nuclear Power Plants, 
18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 630 (2011). On February 9, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission voted to permit construction of two nuclear reactors at the Vogtle nuclear-power 
plant in Georgia, the first new reactors in more than thirty years. Ayesha Rascoe, NRC 
Approves First New Nuclear Plant in a Generation, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-usa-nuclear-license-idUSTRE8181T420120209. 
 2. Peter Behr, Three Mile Island Still Haunts U.S. Nuclear Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/03/27/27greenwire-three-mile-island-still-haunts-us-
reactor-indu-10327.html. 
 3. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, BACKGROUNDER ON THE THREE MILE 
ISLAND ACCIDENT (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
3mile-isle.html. 
 4. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 630–48 (discussing the risks attending plant construction, 
engineering, fuel costs, staffing, security, safety, decommissioning, licensing, and waste 
management). 
 5. See, e.g., Jennifer Weeks, Nuclear Experts Assess How Well Media Covered Fukushima, 
SOC’Y OF ENVTL. JOURNALISTS (July 15, 2011), http://www.sej.org/publications/sejournal/
nuclear-experts-assess-how-well-media-covered-fukushima (describing fervent and inaccurate 
media reporting following the Fukushima incident in early 2011); Nassrine Azimi, Opinion, 
Fukushima in America, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/opinion/
11iht-edazimi11.html (inquiring whether the United States has fallen into “nuclear entrapment” 
and positing the Fukushima disaster as a moment of reflection for the nuclear industry); Scott 
Waldman, Cuomo’s Complicated Indian Point Equation, CAPITAL N.Y. (Apr. 7, 2014, 9:50 
AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/magazine/2014/04/8543109/cuomos-complicated-
indian-point-equation (contrasting the Indian Point nuclear-power plant’s favorable safety 
record with resistance to relicensing from prominent environmental groups and the governor of 
New York). 
 6. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 631–53 (describing uncertain costs incurred as a result of 
plant engineering, project financing, construction delays, staffing, plant safety and security, and 
subsequent litigation). 
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Congress first addressed the complex risks of nuclear power by 
enacting the 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA),7 creating a licensing 
regime that permitted civilians to use nuclear fuel for the first time.8 
Congress then amended the AEA in 1957 through the Price-
Anderson Act (PAA),9 mandating that nuclear licensees carry private 
insurance to hedge against the risk of liability that could result from a 
major nuclear incident.10 In recent years, a senescing cadre of nuclear-
power plants11—which provide 19.4 percent of the country’s escalating 
energy needs12—has overshadowed the industry. Reacting through the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005,13 Congress has enacted policies to spur 
further investment in nuclear technologies, providing financial 
assistance in the form of production tax credits, low-interest federal 
loans, and insurance insulating many reactors from the costs of 
regulatory and licensing delays.14 But as companies seek to site, 
develop, and maintain these plants over the next half-century, one 
little-studied threat for the nuclear industry and the public has been 
glossed over: the risk of civil litigation itself.15 
Over the years, Congress has somewhat mitigated the cost of 
litigating claims of radiation-related harm to third parties from 
nuclear licensees—companies working with nuclear materials—by 
requiring them to carry significant liability insurance.16 These 
 
 7. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 8. See id. at § 53(a) (permitting the Atomic Energy Commission to issue licenses for 
domestic possession of “special nuclear material”); John V. Buffington, Underwriting the 
Ultimate Tort, 87 DICK. L. REV. 679, 682 (1983) (observing that private possession of nuclear 
fuel was prohibited until the 1954 AEA). 
 9. Atomic Energy Damages Act (Price-Anderson Act), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, 
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012). 
 10. 1 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 13 (1990), available at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/rpccna. 
 11. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 623 (observing that all nuclear reactors operating in the 
United States were ordered in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 12. US Nuclear Generating Statistics, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-Nuclear-Generating-
Statistics (last updated Apr. 14, 2014). 
 13. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 638, 119 Stat. 594, 791–94, 42 U.S.C. § 
16014 (2012). 
 14. JAY M. GUTIERREZ & ALEX S. POLONSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 97–98 (2d ed. 2007). 
 15. For a discussion of the history of and claims in Price-Anderson Act suits, see infra 
Part I. 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (2012) (requiring licensees to hold financial protection in 
“the amount of liability insurance available from private sources”); 78 Fed. Reg. 41,835, 41,836 
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requirements compel nuclear licensees to carry liability insurance 
indemnifying them in any judgment for harms to third parties up to a 
statutory maximum.17 Today, administrative remedies are used to 
address many of the harms caused by radioactive materials to 
uranium miners, as well as military personnel and civilians near 
nuclear-test sites.18 But Congress utilized a separate statutory 
framework—the PAA—to impose liability for harms to the general 
public.19 
Under the PAA, private plaintiffs may sue for physical or 
economic harms arising from the “hazardous properties of radioactive 
material” emitted from a nuclear-power plant, a fuel-fabrication 
operation, a uranium mill, or any similar facility during a “nuclear 
incident.”20 The PAA’s litigation mechanism is the so-called “public 
liability” lawsuit,21 a complex,22 one-way,23 exclusive ticket to federal 
court.24 PAA suits usually take the form of class actions because 
radioactive materials may disperse widely and affect large 
 
(July 12, 2013) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2014)) (increasing the primary financial-
protection layer to $375,000,000 to reflect inflation). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (requiring deferred, retrospective insurance premiums assessed 
against the nuclear industry in the event of a major nuclear incident). 
 18. See infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text. 
 19. This Note focuses on the PAA, the exclusive means of remedying claims by third 
parties arising out of a nuclear incident, rather than the distinct disaster-relief services provided 
by federal agencies or nongovernmental organizations. For example, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is tasked with executing emergency plans to protect the public 
from imminent harm. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, http://www.fema.gov/radiological-emergency-preparedness-
program (last updated June 19, 2014). Such agencies would be unlikely to address the cost of 
compensating injuries or cleaning up the reactor site. E.g., Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., No. 
50-293-LR, 2012 WL 1207269, at *3 (N.R.C. Mar. 30, 2012).  
 20. For a description of the effects of an internal accident at a nuclear-power plant, see 
generally Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 1937 (2011).  
 21. Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation? The Sixty-
Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 163 n.11 (1991) (describing statutory provisions of the PAA as 
“complex”); Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for 
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 498, 517 (1981) (same). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2012) (permitting the removal of public liability suits from 
state court to federal court). 
 24. See id. (creating federal jurisdiction for the district in which the “nuclear incident [took] 
place”); Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1553 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that members of the 
general public harmed by radiation from a nuclear-power plant can “sue under the Price-
Anderson Act . . . or not at all”). 
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populations in nearby areas.25 Unlike a car collision or a badly built 
widget, any physical harms imposed by radiation emissions are 
impossible to see, slow to materialize, and virtually untraceable to a 
single identifiable cause. Indeed, litigating a PAA suit is a forensic 
kabuki dance: all players know that proving “causation” is a matter of 
probability and not of fact, yet both parties mechanically act out the 
motions of a tort suit at common law. 
This Note tackles the hardship that the PAA’s common-law 
causation rules would create in the wake of a major nuclear incident. 
Whether the incident should result from an intentional act such as a 
terrorist attack26 or as the unintended consequence of a reactor 
malfunction, such an event might cause damage in excess of $100 
billion.27 Relying on the rich history of smaller radiation-injury suits 
litigated to date, this Note argues that the PAA’s causation rule 
should impose liability directly in proportion to the statistical chance 
of increased harm to third parties. Such a rule not only forces the 
nuclear-power industry to pay directly for negative externalities 
imposed on the public, but dispels the specter of bank-breaking 
judgments that could bring a slowly developing industry to its knees.  
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the provisions 
of the PAA, explains how defendants pay for and settle public 
liability lawsuits, and surveys decades of litigation. Part II provides an 
overview of how radiation harms humans, focusing on the 
probabilistic effects of low-level radiation exposure. Part III contrasts 
two methodologies for applying scientific understandings of 
radiation-induced28 cancers to the ill-fitting burdens of proof required 
to demonstrate specific causation in U.S. courts. It shows that 
combining epidemiological data with the traditional preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard would bar the claims of all injured plaintiffs, 
but that relying on individualized clinical evidence would overdeter 
defendants. Part IV observes that the all-or-nothing causation rules of 
state tort law are inapposite to public liability suits because conclusive 
links between a particular instance of injury and a particular radiation 
 
 25. For a summary of major class-action litigation, see infra Part I.C. 
 26. For an overview of the potential aftermath of a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor, see 
generally Jason Zorn, Note, Compensation in the Event of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power 
Plant: Will Victims Be Adequately Protected?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1087 (2004). 
 27. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 28. Recognizing the uncertainty inherent in identifying the cause of any incidence of 
cancer, this Note will use the term “radiation-induced” to refer not only to cancers that were in 
fact caused by radiation, but those that hypothetically could have been caused by radiation. 
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source cannot be proven. Part IV further argues that implementing a 
“proportional liability” standard would benefit all parties by tying 
recovery directly to the excess risks imposed on plaintiffs. Finally, 
Part V addresses obstacles to implementing proportional liability, 
proposing modifications to the PAA’s “fault” and “injury” standards 
that would prevent plaintiffs and defendants from manipulating the 
effects of current PAA law on a proportional liability regime. 
I.  A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PUBLIC LIABILITY SUITS UNDER THE 
PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
  The Price-Anderson Act is one of the most complicated, least 
understood, and least used laws I have encountered in all my years 
in the House. Yet its purpose is simple and its role is important. 
Quite simply, the Price-Anderson Act ensures that adequate funds 
will be available to compensate the public in the event of a nuclear 
accident.29 
Before the AEA’s enactment in 1954, the federal government 
carefully guarded the secrets of nuclear power.30 In his 1953 speech, 
“Atoms for Peace,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised that 
nuclear power could be harvested “to provide abundant electrical 
energy in the power-starved areas of the world”31 through paving the 
way for private commercial development.32 Despite Eisenhower’s 
proclamation that the AEA would turn “swords into plowshares” by 
allowing private peaceful applications for nuclear energy,33 would-be 
investors nonetheless voiced concerns that potential profits from 
 
 29. 133 CONG. REC. 21,414 (1987) (statement of Rep. Udall). 
 30. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that prior to the enactment of the AEA, the 
federal government held a “monopoly over nuclear materials and their use”). 
 31. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), in PUB. PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953, at 813, 821 (1954). 
Notably, contemporary projections suggested no immediate need for nuclear reactors. Rather, 
“[t]he prevailing sense of urgency . . . reflected instead the fear of falling behind other nations in 
fostering peaceful atomic progress.” J. SAMUEL WALKER & THOMAS R. WELLOCK, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR REGULATION, 1946-2009, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1029/ML102980443.pdf. 
 32. Buffington, supra note 8, at 681–82. 
 33. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
193 (1983). 
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nuclear energy were limited, whereas its potential liabilities were 
immense.34 
Congress quelled investors’ unease over the risks of nuclear 
power by enacting the PAA in 1957.35 The PAA requires reactor 
licensees to purchase the “maximum amount of liability insurance 
available” to insure themselves against potential injuries to third 
parties.36 Licensees are permitted to use these insurance funds to 
cover the costs of litigating and settling claims.37 Recognizing that 
damages—potentially ranging as high as $100 billion today38—might 
exceed the total available insurance, the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC)39 indemnified licensees up to another $500 million.40 Beyond 
that value, damages were entirely “capped,” preventing the public 
from receiving additional compensation.41 
A. The Nuclear Industry’s Transition from Governmental Indemnity 
to Private Insurance 
Through subsequent amendments, Congress required the nuclear 
industry to internalize the costs of potential harms to the public. In 
1975, just over two decades after the AEA was passed, Congress 
largely42 ushered the government out of the nuclear-insurance 
 
 34. See, e.g., Harold Green, Nuclear Power, Risk, Liability, Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
479, 480–81 (1973) (recognizing the dual problem for investors of a remote potential for profit 
“in the relatively remote and uncertain future” and the “major roadblock” of liability to the 
public). 
 35. Id. at 483–87. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)–(b) (2012). 
 37. Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements, 10 C.F.R. § 140.3(d) 
(2013). 
 38. Hypothetical scenarios have damages ranging from $10 billion to $100 billion. Michael 
G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 219, 266 (2009). 
 39. The AEC was divided into an energy-research arm and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in 1974. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 31, at 49. 
 40. Id. at 15–16. 
 41. Id. The Supreme Court found the liability cap compliant with due-process and equal-
protection principles. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87, 93 
(1978). 
 42. Although the United States no longer directly indemnifies private nuclear licensees, 
limiting the total compensation awardable to the public can still be visualized as an effective 
subsidy to the industry. For further discussion and explanation, see infra note 51.  
O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  6:37 PM 
340 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:333 
business, replacing publicly guaranteed indemnity with privately 
funded insurance pools.43 
Today, the first layer of compensation available in a public 
liability suit remains fixed at the maximum insurance available to a 
single nuclear licensee.44 This limitation is currently set at $375 million 
per reactor45 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)—a nuclear-insurance pool largely 
comprised of domestic property-casualty insurance companies.46 If a 
nuclear incident caused more than $375 million in damages, a second 
layer of compensation would activate.47 At this stage, every other 
nuclear licensee in the United States would contribute up to $127 
million per reactor48 to finance a large-scale litigation or settlement 
through additional pro rata charges known as “retrospective 
premiums,” which would be assessed against each nuclear reactor 
following an accident by any one of them.49 Accordingly, as more 
 
 43. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 14–15 (describing how the 1975 PAA amendments 
reduced the federal indemnity of $560 million by the amount of funding that nuclear licensees 
could obtain through private insurance and payment of retrospective premiums). Once the 
private funding available exceeded $560 million, federal indemnity no longer existed. Thus, 
although the PAA still addresses indemnification of private licensees in § 2210(c), that section 
no longer requires governmental indemnity. See id. at 15 (“[O]nce the federal indemnity had 
been eliminated, the liability limit would increase as the number of operating reactors increased. 
The layer of federal indemnity was eliminated upon the licensing of the 80th reactor in 1982.”). 
Unlike private nuclear-reactor licensees, Department of Energy contractors remain directly 
indemnified by the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)(2) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary . . . 
shall indemnify the persons indemnified against such liability above the amount of the financial 
protection required, in the amount of $10,000,000,000 . . . .”). The activities of such contractors 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (2012). 
 45. Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance, AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS 2 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.amnucins.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20the%20US.pdf. 
 46. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER 
RELIEF 1 (June 2014), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/nuclear-insurance.pdf. As an alternative to the investor-held ANI, nuclear licensees were 
able to insure through a policyholder-owned mutual-insurance pool. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N 
ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 13–14. But ANI has been the only 
nuclear-insurance pool in the United States since 1998. Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 38, 
at 254. Nuclear operators insure themselves against direct, on-site damage through a separate 
insurer, Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS, supra note 45, at 2. Insurance premiums for the primary 
layer of financial protection are approximately $1.1 million per reactor per year. U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 1. 
 49. Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 6. 
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reactors are licensed in the United States, each licensee can expect to 
benefit from a larger pool of secondary liability insurance.50  
Taking both layers into account, $13.6 billion is currently 
available for a public liability lawsuit arising out of a major nuclear 
incident,51 in addition to a likely congressional backstop.52 Because the 
second layer is paid directly by all plant owners, it serves as a 
deterrent and penalty leveled against nuclear operators, reducing the 
potential for moral hazard present in many insurance schemes. 
Furthermore, because the whole industry becomes liable in part for 
the tortious acts of each participant, the PAA’s scheme encourages 
industry actors to monitor other operators’ compliance with 
regulatory standards.53 
B. The Price-Anderson Act’s Requirement that Federal Courts Apply 
Exclusively State Law 
The first public liability suits hardly differed from common-law 
tort claims54 and were litigated in state courts until the Three Mile 
Island (TMI) incident.55 At that time, federal jurisdiction was 
available only if the NRC determined that the case resulted from an 
 
 50. Id. at 6–7. 
 51. AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS, supra note 45, at 2. The debate over the adequacy of the 
compensation fund for a major incident has received significant attention. See generally Michael 
Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 419 (2009) (deeming the PAA’s liability limit “less distorting” than its international 
counterparts, but nonetheless inadequate); Daniel Meek, Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-
Anderson Act: Promotion over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393 (1978) (arguing that the 
fund’s then-current compensation scheme, similarly structured but with a liability cap less than 
one-tenth of today’s amount, was “grossly deficient” in the 1970s). But see generally Joseph 
Marrone, The Price-Anderson Act: The Insurance Industry’s View, 12 FORUM 605 (1977) 
(considering the 1970s compensation fund adequate); Zorn, supra note 26 (finding 
compensation adequate in a terrorist attack on a nuclear-power plant). 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2012) (“In the event of a nuclear incident involving 
damages in excess of the amount of aggregate public liability under paragraph (1), the Congress 
will . . . take whatever action is determined to be necessary . . . to provide full and prompt 
compensation to the public for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such 
magnitude.”). 
 53. See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 38, at 272 (observing an incentive for reciprocal 
monitoring because “any low quality operation will lead to increased financial exposure” for 
other operators). 
 54. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 4 (“The Act did not create a federal cause of action for 
damages arising out of a nuclear incident, and it did not alter any of the rules of state law that 
might apply.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that common-law tort claims brought in state court against a radiopharmaceutical plant 
were not barred by federal preemption of nuclear regulation). 
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“extraordinary nuclear occurrence” (ENO).56 Because the statute 
imposed no timeline on deciding whether an incident was an ENO, it 
relegated plaintiffs to an “unusual jurisdictional limbo” between state 
and federal courts until the NRC issued a ruling.57 In the TMI 
litigation, a district court held that Congress intended federal 
jurisdiction to cover “borderline” cases as long as an ENO was 
alleged in good faith.58 The Third Circuit ultimately reversed this 
holding.59 
Following the Third Circuit’s ruling, and after over three 
thousand plaintiffs brought more than one hundred cases in both 
federal and state courts,60 representatives from both sides of the 
litigation testified before Congress that it would be more efficient if 
all nuclear accidents, regardless of size, were litigated in federal 
district courts.61 Congress amended the PAA to so provide in 1988, 
imbuing all nuclear incidents with federal jurisdiction.62 The 
amendments also enacted procedural mechanisms for increasing the 
efficiency of PAA suits, such as caseload-management panels.63 
Once a case arrives in federal court, however, the PAA does not 
provide substantive federal law for adjudicating the suit. As early as 
the 1960s, Congress considered creating a federal system of nuclear 
tort law to adjudicate PAA cases with greater certainty and 
uniformity.64 But the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy balked at 
the effort and advised Congress to retain state tort rules in public 
 
 56. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“Accordingly, unless the diversity statute applied or the action resulted from an ‘extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence,’ nuclear-related tort claims typically could not proceed in federal court.”). 
 57. In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 437 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
 58. See id. at 435–38 (holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over “lawsuits 
seeking damages from a nuclear incident of the magnitude of TMI.”). 
 59. See Stibitz v. Gen. Pub. Util. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 996 n.3, 997 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding 
that, except for ENOs, the PAA did not provide for federal jurisdiction); Kiick v. Metro. Edison 
Co., 784 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). 
 60. S. REP. NO. 100-218, at 13 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1488. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2012) (creating federal jurisdiction and allowing removal to 
federal court for cases “resulting from a nuclear incident”); id. § 2014(q) (defining “nuclear 
incident” as an injury “resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of source, special, nuclear, or byproduct material”). 
 63. See id. § 2210(n)(3) (granting the chief judge of the district court with jurisdiction over 
the case permission to create management panels of other district and appellate judges if the 
case has an “unusual” impact on the work of the court or if the aggregate public liability is 
great); id. § 2210(n)(3)(C) (permitting management panels to consolidate cases, establish claim 
priority, and assign cases to judges or special masters). 
 64. S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 9 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201, 3209. 
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liability cases.65 The Supreme Court ultimately followed suit, adopting 
a policy of minimal interference66 with state law. In Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission,67 the Court acknowledged that many of Congress’s 
actions—such as the creation of the AEC—suggested that the entire 
field of nuclear safety was preempted. Nonetheless, the Court 
observed that states remained free to regulate activities such as 
nuclear-power-plant licensure on economic grounds.68 The Court then 
ruled in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.69 that federal law permitted 
punitive-damage awards for radiation-related injuries as long as they 
were permitted under state law.70 Today, federal courts ruling on 
PAA claims continue to apply the substantive law of the state in 
which the nuclear incident occurred unless doing so would be 
inconsistent with the PAA.71 
C. Modern Price-Anderson Act Cases Evincing Rising Costs and 
Significant Complications 
For the first two decades of the PAA’s existence, public liability 
suits were inexpensive and straightforward to litigate, particularly for 
the nuclear industry. A spreadsheet tracking expected, hypothesized, 
and settled lawsuits contains just over one page addressing claims 
resolutions before 1980, and those claimants were indemnified for 
under $2 million in total.72 Because of the absence of notable nuclear 
incidents in the United States for the first two decades of the PAA, 
nuclear insurers were even able to return much of their required 
 
 65. See id. (“[T]he committee does not believe it is necessary to go to the length of enacting 
substantive law . . . to achieve these ends.”). The Joint Committee believed that a waiver of 
defenses at the fault stage was sufficient to resolve legal uncertainties in major incidents, and 
that new federal law on causation and damages would be excessive. Id. at 3209–10. 
 66. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 6 (1966), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201, 3206 (“Since 
its enactment by Congress in 1957 one of the cardinal attributes of the Price-Anderson Act has 
been its minimal interference with State law.”). 
 67. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983). 
 68. Id. at 216. 
 69. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
 70. Id. at 246–58. The PAA does prohibit punitive-damage awards when the United States 
must indemnify a defendant such as a government contractor. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2012). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012). 
 72. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT—CROSSING THE 
BRIDGE TO THE NEXT CENTURY 85 (1998). 
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insurance premiums after reserving them for ten-year increments.73 
But on March 28, 1979, the reactor-core meltdown at TMI changed 
the public’s perception of the industry as Americans watched 
residents within a five-mile radius of the nuclear-power plant 
evacuate their homes.74 The President’s Commission on the Accident 
at Three Mile Island75 as well as private research institutions76 
independently investigated potential health effects experienced by 
nearby residents. Though a consensus emerged that public exposures 
were negligible,77 the TMI incident nonetheless sparked increased 
distrust of the nuclear industry.78 The ensuing litigation settled for $71 
million.79 A 1997 Congressional report on the Price-Anderson Act 
found that TMI accounted for more than half of what ANI had then 
paid to resolve all lawsuits dating back to 1957.80  
In courts throughout the country, the claims against the TMI 
plant and its operators prompted similar litigation against other 
nuclear-power plants and NRC licensees. In addition to the TMI 
suits, the Third Circuit decided cases stemming from uranium-
processing and waste-disposal activities in western Pennsylvania.81 
 
 73. Id. at 82. In the 1950s and 1960s, insurers generally returned 95 to 99 percent of reserve 
premiums. The refund rate for 1969 premiums, which were due to be paid out after the TMI 
incident in 1979, fell to a historic low of 27.9 percent. The return rate recovered to 70 percent 
over the next fifteen years. Id. at 83.  
 74. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3. 
 75. JOHN G. KEMENY ET AL., STAFF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE 
ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 1 (1979). 
 76. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3 (“[C]omprehensive 
assessments by several well respected institutions, such as Columbia University and the 
University of Pittsburgh, have concluded . . . the actual release had negligible effects on the 
physical health of individuals or the environment.”). 
 77. Id.; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at xvii. 
 78. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3. 
 79. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., INSURANCE: PRICE-ANDERSON ACT PROVIDES EFFECTIVE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE AT NO COST TO THE PUBLIC 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/Price_Anderson_Act_Sept_2012.pdf. 
 80. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at 84 (concluding that ANI 
had spent approximately $131 million on indemnity and defense costs by 1997, of which $70 
million related to the Three Mile Island incident). By 2008, ANI had spent $304 million in 
indemnity and litigation expenses. Marjorie Berger, Managing Nuclear Risks in the United 
States: INLA Inter Jura Congress 2009, AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.amnucins.com/library/INLA-2009.pdf. 
 81. Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 716, 734 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (granting a 
motion for a new bellwether trial in a several-hundred-plaintiff suit against now-defunct fuel-
fabrication facilities); McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 
F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (addressing discovery motions in nine newly filed multi-
plaintiff suits by community residents against the same facilities). 
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The Ninth Circuit ruled on thousands of claims relating to cancers 
allegedly caused by radioiodine emissions at the Hanford plutonium-
production facility in Washington82 as well as class-action and single-
plaintiff suits against rocket-testing facilities in southern California.83 
The Sixth Circuit addressed suits alleging an increased risk of cancer 
and property damage from emissions at a nuclear-weapons facility in 
Ohio,84 culminating in the creation of a settlement fund and lifetime 
medical monitoring for former employees.85 In Kentucky, employees 
at uranium-enrichment facilities and nearby residents sued plant 
owners, alleging “subcellular” harm and property damage.86 Finally, 
claims against uranium mills in Colorado and New Mexico87 and the 
Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.88 case against the Rocky Flats 
nuclear-weapons-production facility near Denver89 transformed the 
Tenth Circuit into the primary stomping ground of recent public 
liability suits. 
In such recent public liability suits, the financial threat to the 
nuclear industry has been significant. By 2009, ANI had paid out $300 
million,90 and an additional $80 million settlement with a former 
operator was still being litigated.91 Although ANI has historically 
 
 82. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 83. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 84. Day v. NLO, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 40, 41 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
 85. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
90; Tim Bonfield, History Repeats Itself, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 11, 1996, 
http://enquirer.com/fernald/stories/021196c_fernald.html.  
 86. See Smith v. Carbide & Chems. Corp., 507 F.3d 372, 374–77 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(summarizing residents’ property claims for water and soil contamination); Rainer v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 611, 613 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing allegations of “future harms” 
that could result from damage to DNA). 
 87. See Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing 
personal-injury claims against a uranium mill); June v. Union Carbide Co., 577 F.3d 1234, 1236–
38 (10th Cir. 2009) (addressing personal-injury and medical-monitoring claims against a 
uranium- and vanadium-mining company); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1217–20 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (ruling on trespass, negligence, nuisance, and emotional-distress claims against a 
uranium mill); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1500–01 (10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing 
jurisdiction in a suit by Navajo Nation against a nearby uranium mill); Boughton v. Cotter 
Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 825 (10th Cir. 1995) (addressing medical-monitoring claims against a 
uranium mill).  
 88. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 89. See id. at 1133 (ruling on property claims brought by nearby residents); Building & 
Constr. Dept. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993) (ruling on medical-
monitoring claims by former employees and unions). 
 90. Berger, supra note 80. 
 91. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 76 A.3d 1, 3–7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). 
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retained almost $300 million in litigation reserves,92 the threat of 
bank-breaking judgments continues to haunt its member operators, 
particularly in cases with little apparent merit. Epitomizing this threat 
is the Cook case against the Rocky Flats nuclear-weapons-production 
facility in Denver, in which the jury awarded roughly $1 billion in 
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged plutonium 
contamination of the plaintiffs’ property.93 At trial, the linchpin of the 
plaintiffs’ strategy was for experts to explain that any radioactive 
contamination on their property, no matter how small, could cause an 
increase in the risk of getting cancer.94 Ultimately, the lower court 
instructed the jury that no appreciable health risk needed to be shown 
in order for plaintiffs to recover.95 If paid in full, the judgment would 
have greatly exceeded the plant’s first layer of liability, forcing 
nuclear operators nationwide to contribute more than $600 million.96 
After it was reversed on appeal, the case was remanded, then re-
appealed on the issue of whether the PAA inherently preempts state 
law claims based on the same facts.97 
Furthermore, the complex legal issues plaguing public liability 
suits have often caused plaintiffs’ claims to languish without any hope 
of a court reaching a final judgment. Indeed, suits against 
Washington’s Hanford Nuclear Reservation, the “nation’s most 
contaminated area,”98 were first filed in 1990, and bounced between 
the district and appellate courts for more than eighteen years.99 
Notwithstanding favorable bellwether verdicts for two thyroid-cancer 
 
 92. See Price-Anderson Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp., 
Infrastructure, and Nuclear Safety of S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 107th Cong. 57 
(2003) (statement of John L. Quattrocchi, Senior Vice President for Underwriting, Am. Nuclear 
Insurers) (noting that ANI then held $282 million in reserve for indemnity and defense of 
outstanding claims). 
 93. COOK V. ROCKWELL INT’L CORP., VERDICT PROFILE 1 (2013), available at Bloomberg 
Law. 
 94. Cook, 618 F.3d at 1134. 
 95. See id. (“Plaintiffs are not required to show that plutonium is present on the Class 
Properties at any particular level or concentration, that they suffered any bodily harm because 
of the plutonium, or that the presence of plutonium on the Class Properties damaged these 
properties in some other way.”). 
 96. See supra notes 41–42.  
 97. Transcript of Record at 197, Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 14-1112 (10th Cir. Mar. 
26, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
 98. Gerald F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated Place in the United 
States, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 180 (1996). 
 99. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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claimants,100 later settlement offers made to other residents with 
thyroid disease in the Hanford cases were relative pittances.101 
Overall, little of the money paid by nuclear insurers supports claims 
settlements. Excluding the payouts from TMI, twenty-three times as 
much has been expended on legal fees as on compensation.102 
As discussed further in Part III, the cost, duration, and perceived 
unfairness of adjudicating public liability suits under the PAA partly 
results from the difficulty of deciding whether a nuclear-power plant’s 
radiation releases have “caused” a particular injury.103 Indeed, in 1990, 
the Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents (the 
Presidential Commission), which was tasked with suggesting potential 
changes to the PAA, found that the “principal problem” with 
compensating public liability claims is “the difficulty of proving or 
defending such claims on the issue of causation in fact.”104 
Individualized causation issues in public liability suits are extensively 
litigated through “prediscovery” orders,105 through summary-
judgment motions,106 and through Daubert hearings107 at which 
competing experts vie for the judge’s ear on the causes of radiation-
induced cancers. These experts disagree over the factual 
 
 100. See id. at 1000, 1017 (affirming judgments totaling approximately $550,000 in favor of 
thyroid-cancer plaintiffs). 
 101. See Hanford Down-Winder Pursues a Settlement for Exposure to Radioactive Fallout, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 8, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/06/
hanford_down-winder_pursues_a.html (reporting thyroid-cancer settlements ranging from 
$10,000 to $15,000); Hanford Offers Sent to Hundreds, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Apr. 1, 2012, 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/apr/01/hanford-offers-sent-out (reporting eighty-six 
hypothyroid-disease-settlement offers totaling $524,600). 
 102. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at 92. In comparison, 
administrative costs in the much-maligned asbestos litigation only exceeded compensation paid 
to plaintiffs by a two-to-one ratio. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass 
Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 953 (1993). 
 103. See, e.g., Marcie Rosenthal, How the Price-Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry, 
15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 127 (1990) (“Victims of a nuclear accident have the burden of 
proving causation. This poses a difficult, if not impossible challenge to plaintiffs seeking 
compensation from radiation-induced injuries.”).  
 104. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
101. 
 105. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 106. E.g., Cotroneo v. Shaw Envtl. & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 192–93 (5th Cir. 
2011) (granting summary judgment for lack of a causal nexus between radiation exposure and 
injury); Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., 528 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 107. For a paradigmatic and methodical analysis of radiation dose experts in a public 
liability suit, see In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666–722 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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circumstances of radiation exposure,108 the rates at which radiation 
exposure causes cancer,109 and whether certain radionuclides can 
cause cancer at all.110 To date, the federal courts of appeals have been 
unable to agree on issues of specific causation because, as discussed 
previously, the PAA paradoxically defers these substantive questions 
to state tort law.111 
II.  RADIATION AS SCIENTIFIC CAUSE 
A brief primer on radiation’s health effects on humans is 
essential to understand how scientific theories of causation diverge 
from their legal counterparts. Radiation consists of the emission of 
alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma rays112 from unstable nuclei 
as they decay.113 Such emissions—called ionizing radiation—cause 
“ionization” by knocking electrons from their orbits, creating 
additional charged particles.114 These emissions can directly and 
indirectly damage structures within the human body as cells are 
disrupted or killed by the ionizing radiation itself, and as energy is 
transferred to cells triggering second-order chemical changes.115 
 
 108. See, e.g., id. at 659–61 (contrasting studies by defendants and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health showing no exposures above NRC limits with the plaintiffs’ experts’ 
theory of a “blowout” plume of radioactive gases that evaded nearby radiation monitors). 
 109. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(assessing differing testimony from plaintiffs and defendants as to whether thyroid cancer can 
be caused by less than forty rads of radiation exposure). 
 110. See, e.g., McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 
347, 356–57 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (addressing defendants’ objections that there is insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that unenriched uranium is a human carcinogen). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012). In the words of one commentator, “Price-Anderson 
simply works to defer responsibility and resolution of important issues.” Rosenthal, supra note 
103, at 127. 
 112. An alpha particle consists of two protons and two neutrons, JAMES E. TURNER, 
ATOMS, RADIATION, AND RADIATION PROTECTION 61 n.3 (3d ed. 2007), whereas beta particles 
are electrons emitted from the nucleus of an atom, id. at 65. Gamma rays are electromagnetic 
radiation emitted as photons from nuclei after radioactive decay. Id. at 68. 
 113. Id. at 58–71. 
 114. Id. at 109, 139. Non-ionizing radiation produced by microwaves and radios is not 
thought to cause long-term health effects because it lacks sufficient energy to do so. 
Microwaves, Radio Waves, and Other Types of Radiofrequency Radiation, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/radiationexposureandcancer/radiofrequency-
radiation (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Most studies show that radiofrequency waves from cell 
phones cannot cause DNA damage, and are therefore not a cancer risk. Cellular Phones, AM. 
CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/athome/cellular-
phones (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 115. TURNER, supra note 112, at 408. 
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Acute radiation syndrome may kill or damage enough cells to 
cause lasting harm to bodily tissues and organs, and can be lethal 
when critical organs are exposed to sufficiently high doses.116 Doses of 
one to three gray117 may lead to “[m]ild to severe nausea, malaise, 
anorexia, [or] infection.” Exposures of three to six gray can result in 
“hemorrhaging, infection, diarrhea, epilation, [and] temporary 
sterility,”118 and exposures in the range of 3.5 gray or more can be 
fatal.119 Receiving more than six gray impairs the nervous system, and 
more than ten gray incapacitates the exposed individual, generally 
resulting in death.120 The symptoms of the resultant “acute radiation 
syndrome” are deterministic: whether or not they will occur can be 
assessed based on dosage and conditions of exposure, although their 
manifestations may vary somewhat from person to person.121 
Exposure to lower doses of ionizing radiation leads to so-called 
“delayed somatic effects.”122 Such effects are stochastic, rather than 
deterministic—there is a chance, but not a certainty, that injury will 
develop based on the level of exposure.123 Most notable is the 
potential damage to the controls regulating cellular division in human 
DNA, resulting in uncontrolled cellular growths.124 After a latency 
period—often ranging between two and ten years—such growths may 
manifest as cancer.125 The prevailing analysis of this process for solid 
cancers, embraced by major health-physics societies,126 is the “linear 
no-threshold” (LNT) model, which states that even de minimis 
 
 116. Id. at 419. 
 117. The gray, the “international system (SI) unit of radiation dose expressed in terms of 
absorbed energy per unit mass of tissue,” is equivalent to 100 rads. Gray (Gy), HEALTH 
PHYSICS SOC’Y, http://hps.org/publicinformation/radterms/radfact79.html (last updated Aug. 13, 
2014). 
 118. TURNER, supra note 112, at 421. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 410, 419–21. 
 122. Id. at 421–23. 
 123. Id. at 421–22. 
 124. Id. at 429. 
 125. Id. at 421–22. 
 126. Underlying the LNT model are the findings of the United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the National Council on Radiation Protection 
and Measurements, and the National Academy of Sciences that DNA damage is strictly 
proportional to dosage at “reasonably low” doses of radiation. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 
RADIOGENIC CANCER RISK MODELS AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. POPULATION 6 (2011), 
available at http://epa.gov/rpdweb00/docs/bluebook/bbfinalversion.pdf. 
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exposure has the potential to cause cancer.127 Although “the 
probability that cancer will result from [a given exposure] increases 
proportionally with [the] dose,”128 not all forms of cancer are alike. 
Some cancers, like red-blood-cell and bone-marrow leukemias, and 
lung, skin, thyroid, breast, or stomach cancers, are more strongly 
linked to radiation exposure.129 
Although some radiation-induced cancers may be attributable to 
nuclear-power production, most result from a variety of mundane 
sources of radiation.130 Each year, the public is exposed to radiation 
from radon, cosmic rays, medical devices,131 and even banana 
consumption.132 Unlike a chemical product, which may be traceable to 
a particular manufacturer, different sources of radiation are not 
distinguishable, nor is there any noticeable difference between 
cancers caused by nuclear-power production and those caused by 
other sources of radiation.133   
 
 127. Id. The National Research Council’s BEIR VII Committee employed a linear-
quadratic model for leukemia, TURNER, supra note 112, at 422, although epidemiological data 
are also consistent with the linear model at low doses, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126, 
at 10–15. In contrast to the LNT model, “adaptive response” theories suggest that exposure to 
very low levels of radiation may actually trigger bodily defense mechanisms that fight cancerous 
and precancerous mutations. See TURNER, supra note 112, at 429 (“In some systems, a small 
dose of radiation (e.g., several mGy) triggers a cellular response that protects the cells from a 
large dose of the radiation given subsequently.”); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126, at 11 
(“[L]ow-dose radiation may stimulate defense mechanisms, which could be beneficial in 
preventing cancer or other diseases.”). Furthermore, some courts have rejected the LNT model 
because it is an extrapolation from cancer risks experienced at higher levels of exposure. See 
Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (summarizing 
district-court cases rejecting the LNT theory). 
 128. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 642 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 129. Radiation Exposure and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/
cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/medicaltreatments/radiation-exposure-and-cancer (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 130. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
101. 
 131. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126, at 13–14. 
 132. See Doses in Our Daily Lives, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/around-us/doses-daily-lives.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2014) (describing average radiation doses from medical procedures and ingested food). 
 133. See TURNER, supra note 112, at 468 (“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute a 
given malignancy in a person to his or her past radiation history. Diseases induced by radiation, 
from either natural or man-made sources, also occur spontaneously.”); id. at 410 (“Although we 
might be able to predict the magnitude of the increased incidence, we cannot say which 
particular individuals in the population will contract the disease and which will not.”). 
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III.  RADIATION AS LEGAL CAUSE 
In public liability suits, plaintiffs must prove causation under the 
tort laws of the state in which the incident occurred.134 Under most 
states’ common law, toxic-tort plaintiffs must show “generally” that 
exposure to a substance can cause their injury and “specifically” that 
exposure in fact did cause the injury.135 General causation is satisfied 
by showing that a form of cancer may be attributable to radiation.136 
Specific causation is more problematic because it requires showing 
that the defendant’s emissions were the most likely cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury.137 Some courts have interpreted this standard to 
mean that a plaintiff must show a preponderance of the evidence—at 
least a 50 percent likelihood that the defendant’s emissions caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.138 
A. The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Rule 
For some substances that were the subject of previous toxic-tort 
litigation, plaintiffs could feasibly prove causation above the 50 
percent threshold—by a preponderance of the evidence—if the 
plaintiffs suffered “signature injuries” sufficiently rare that a jury 
merely needed to know that the injury existed to pair it with its cause. 
For example, women exposed in utero to the morning-sickness 
medication diethylstilbestrol (DES) were significantly more likely to 
develop a very rare form of cancer.139 Because studies estimated that 
 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012). 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. g (2010). 
 136. See, e.g., June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing 
in a PAA case that general causation requires the plaintiffs to show that radiation had the 
“capacity” to cause their cancers).  
 137. See, e.g., Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., Inc., 528 F.3d 681, 683 (noting that a 
PAA plaintiff must show that exposure to radiation “in fact” caused his injuries). Showing 
specific causation is problematic because it is “highly individualistic, and depends on the 
characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state of health, lifestyle) and the nature of their 
exposure.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 138. See Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2005) 
(“Courts adopting such a requirement [to show “doubled risk”] have found that the 
requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show 
that the incidence of an injury or condition . . . was more than double the incidence in the 
unexposed or control population.”). 
 139. Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 
VA. L. REV. 713, 718 (1982). Interestingly, men exposed to DES in utero do not appear to bear a 
noticeable increase in cancer risk. See William H. Strohsnitter, Kenneth L. Noller, Robert N. 
Hoover, Stanley J. Robboy, Julie R. Palmer, Linda Titus-Ernstoff, Raymond H. Kaufman, 
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DES caused seven out of every eight such cancers in young women, 
defendants could be said to have caused the injury in the 
overwhelming majority of instances.140 Similarly, in the long-running 
asbestos litigation, proving causation is less difficult because of the 
relative rareness of mesothelioma.141 By contrast, given that radiation-
induced cancers have no “signature” origin, the simple 
preponderance standard has proven problematic to implement and 
difficult to meet. 
As discussed below, courts have taken two approaches to 
implementing the preponderance standard in public liability suits. 
Accepting that the process of attributing causes to cancer is purely 
statistical, some courts apply what mass-torts scholars call the “weak” 
preponderance rule, requiring plaintiffs to rely on epidemiological 
studies showing that it is more than 50 percent likely that the 
plaintiffs contracted cancer from a particular source.142 Others apply a 
“strong” preponderance rule, focusing on individualized assessments 
of a plaintiff’s lifestyle and exposure to other substances to decide 
whether the plaintiff’s cancer is connected to the alleged exposure.143 
B. The Preponderance Rule and Epidemiological Evidence 
In cases in which courts apply a preponderance rule relying 
purely on the incidence of disease in the general population, mass-
tort plaintiffs cannot prevail unless the defendant exposed them to a 
so-called “doubled dose,” which doubled their risk of injury.144 Ruling 
on remand in the infamous Bendectin litigation, Judge Alex Kozinski 
explained: 
 
Ervin Adam, Arthur L. Herbst & Elizabeth E. Hatch, Cancer Risk in Men Exposed In Utero to 
Diethylstilbestrol, 93 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 545, 549–50 (2001) (finding no increased prevalence 
of many cancers, but unclear results for testicular cancer). 
 140. Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-to-Know; Proposed 
Significant New Use Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,020, 41,026 (Sept. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 372 & 721). For the DES plaintiffs, the infamous problem was not proving that DES 
caused their cancers, but proving which particular defendant sold the product that harmed them. 
Robinson, supra note 139, at 719. 
 141. See, e.g., Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the 
argument that the asbestos manufacturer did not cause the plaintiff’s injury because 
“mesothelioma is extremely rare among persons not exposed to asbestos”). 
 142. See infra Part III.B. 
 143. See infra Part III.C. 
 144. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., No. 10-cv-143, 2014 WL 
814878, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014) (noting the Third Circuit requirement that exposure 
levels “exceeded the normal background level”).  
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[T]ort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin 
increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than not 
caused their injuries. . . . Because the background rate of limb 
reduction defects is one per thousand births, plaintiffs must show 
that among children of mothers who took Bendectin the incidence 
of such defects was more than two per thousand.145 
Judge Kozinski concluded that because the plaintiffs’ causation 
experts could not provide evidence that Bendectin was the most likely 
cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, summary judgment was appropriate.146 
The plaintiffs fared only slightly better in the Agent Orange litigation, 
in which Judge Jack Weinstein found a settlement appropriate 
because, in part, no individual plaintiff could have proved at trial that 
his or her chances of developing cancer from the defoliant exceeded 
50 percent.147 
Two recent Tenth Circuit decisions ruling on public liability suits 
illustrate the ongoing problems associated with equating a 
preponderance standard with a 50 percent threshold. In June v. Union 
Carbide Corp.,148 residents of a uranium- and vanadium-mining town 
in Colorado sued the former mill operators, alleging that the mills’ 
operations caused their cancers and that the plaintiffs were likely to 
develop cancers in the future.149 The plaintiffs relied on specific-
causation experts who opined that airborne uranium and vanadium 
tailings would be “substantial factors” in the cancers if the tailings 
constituted at least 5 to 10 percent of the plaintiffs’ total radiation 
exposure.150 However, Colorado tort law, in line with the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,151 requires a “substantial factor” to be sufficient on 
 
 145. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted). 
 146. Id. at 1322. 
 147. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“It is 
likely, however, that even if plaintiffs as a class could prove that they were injured by Agent 
Orange, no individual class member would be able to prove that his or her injuries were caused 
by Agent Orange. . . . The probability of specific cause would necessarily be less than 50% 
based upon the evidence submitted.”).  
 148. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 149. Id. at 1236–37. 
 150. Id. at 1246. 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) (“If two forces are actively 
operating, one because of the actor’s negligence . . . and each of itself sufficient to bring about 
harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it 
about.”).  
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its own to cause the injury.152 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that no individual in the class could demonstrate that the 
defendant’s radiation specifically caused the individual’s cancer.153 
One year later, in an analogous uranium-mining case, Wilcox v. 
Homestake Mining Co.,154 the plaintiffs’ specific-causation expert 
alleged more substantial “assigned share” figures, stating that there 
was up to a 45 percent probability that the defendants’ uranium 
mining caused the plaintiffs’ cancers.155 The Tenth Circuit, employing 
similar reasoning as in its June decision,156 held that New Mexico law’s 
“substantial factor” causation also required that the defendant’s 
conduct be sufficient to cause plaintiffs’ cancers on its own.157 As in 
June, a 45 percent probability that the defendant caused the plaintiffs’ 
injuries still fell short of satisfying the preponderance rule.158 
Applying the preponderance rule in cases relying on 
epidemiological studies creates great difficulties for plaintiffs, who 
usually cannot prove that they were exposed to a “doubled dose” of 
radiation.159 Even in heavily exposed populations, such as survivors 
who were within twenty-five-hundred meters of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki atomic-bomb blasts, the increased chance of developing 
solid tumors160 was no more than 10 percent on average.161 In contrast, 
 
 152. June, 577 F.3d at 1244–45. The Restatement (Third) abandoned the “substantial factor” 
test because it tended to conflate the distinct factual-causation and proximate-causation 
analyses. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. j (2000). But the Restatement (Third) still requires a factual cause of injury to be a “but-for” 
cause of the harm standing “alone.” Id. at § 27; June, 577 F.3d at 1239 (“[T]he ultimate legal 
standards in the two Restatements are essentially identical for our purposes.”). 
 153. See June, 577 F.3d at 1247 (“Plaintiffs . . . have never (not even in this court) contended 
that they have produced evidence that Uravan radiation was a necessary component of a causal 
set that probably would have caused the Plaintiffs’ ailments.”). 
 154. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 155. Id. at 1171 (Lucero, J., concurring in part). 
 156. See id. at 1170 n.2 (majority opinion) (“Although our opinion in June was based on 
Colorado law and we are applying New Mexico law in the instant case, we interpret New 
Mexico law to require the same showing of but-for causation that was required in June.”). 
 157. Id. at 1170. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 110 (noting that the chance that a cancer was caused by a fixed radiation exposure is “well 
below 50 percent even for exposures in the tens of rads range”); cf. David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1983) (“The excess risk caused by exposure to a toxic agent frequently 
does not exceed the background risk . . . .”). 
 160. A solid tumor, or solid cancer, is an “abnormal mass of tissue that usually does not 
contain cysts or liquid areas,” as with sarcomas, carcinomas, or lymphomas. Solid Tumor, NAT’L 
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the maximum annual dose of radiation that a facility is permitted to 
discharge to a member of the public is extremely low.162 Even at a 
one-time dose one hundred times the regulatory limit, the chance that 
a later-developed cancer is attributable to the event may be 
approximately one in forty-two.163  
In single-plaintiff cases, a simple preponderance rule for 
radiation-related injuries can be justified. After all, if a line must be 
drawn somewhere, the 50 percent mark seems like a reasonable place 
to draw it: such a rule prevents recovery when the claimant’s injury 
likely came from another source.164 In a class-action suit for radiation-
related injury, however, the preponderance rule no longer holds 
water. Assuming that the defendants have exposed the public to some 
degree of risk, the judge must decide not merely whether a plaintiff 
was harmed or not, but how many plaintiffs were harmed, and who 
those plaintiffs are. Given enough plaintiffs and a notable increase in 
cancer risk, it becomes virtually certain that some plaintiffs were 
harmed, though no particular plaintiff would ever prevail. Compare 
Judge Jack Weinstein’s hypothetical in the Agent Orange Litigation: 
 
CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?cdrid=45301 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Such 
cancers are contrasted with blood cancers like leukemia, which do not result in solid tumors. 
 161. See Solid Cancer Risks Among Atomic-Bomb Survivors, RADIATION EFFECTS 
RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.rerf.jp/radefx/late_e/cancrisk.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) 
(“For the average radiation exposure of survivors within 2,500 meters (about 0.2 Gy), the 
increase is about 10 percent above normal age-specific rates.”). 
 162. See Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301 (2013) 
(fixing the maximum annual radiation dose from a nuclear facility to a member of the public at 
0.1 rem). 
 163. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF 
IONIZING RADIATION, BEIR VII PHASE 2, at 7 (2006) (predicting that forty-two out of every 
one hundred people will be diagnosed with cancer, but that only one such cancer would result 
from a one-time exposure to 0.1 sievert of radiation above background levels). 0.1 sievert is one 
hundred times the accepted dose limit for members of the public in the United States. See 
Radiation Term: Sievert (Sv), HEALTH PHYSICS SOC’Y, http://hps.org/publicinformation/
radterms/radfact137.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2014) (“One sievert is equivalent to 100 rem.”). 
 164. For example, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program 
creates a federal compensation fund that employs a 50 percent causation threshold for former 
DOE employees at nuclear-weapons-manufacturing and nuclear-weapons-testing facilities. 
NIOSH Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program: Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasfaqs.html (last updated 
Sept. 26, 2014). But members of “special exposure cohorts” with radiation-induced cancers at 
designated facilities receive compensation irrespective of the probability that the facility caused 
their cancers. NIOSH Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program: Special Exposure Cohort, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocassec.html (last 
updated Sept. 26, 2014). 
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Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of 
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among this 
population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected, but 
that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically significant,” 
permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the 
product of the manufacturers. In the absence of other evidence, it 
might be argued that as to any one of the 1100 there is only a chance 
of about 9% (100/1100) that the product caused the cancer. Under 
traditional tort principles no plaintiff could recover.165 
For torts on the scale of nuclear-reactor malfunctions—where 
the harm is inherently generic, lacks a signature, and bears a long 
latency period—the preponderance rule will generally severely 
undercompensate claimants.166 
In the past, defendants have taken particular advantage of the 
low likelihood that any plaintiff’s cancer has been caused by non-
background sources. One defense strategy, adopted from similar 
mass-tort suits, has been to seek specific “pre-discovery” disclosures 
explaining each individual’s theory of exposure.167 These Lone Pine 
orders168 may require plaintiffs to identify the precise radionuclides 
that caused their injuries, the biological pathways of exposure, 
individualized dose estimates, and scientific and medical evidence 
supporting the plaintiffs’ exposure theory.169 Plaintiffs argue that Lone 
 
 165. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 166. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 881 (“In cases in which the probability of causation 
does not exceed fifty percent, the strong and weak versions of the rule both deny victims all 
recovery and thus unjustly enrich defendants. When the probability of causation exceeds fifty 
percent, the rule simply reverses the burden of inequity.”). Of course, if the probability that the 
plaintiffs’ cancers were caused by the defendant is just over 50 percent, the inequity is reversed: 
the defendant has caused only half of the plaintiffs’ injuries, but will pay for all of them.  
 167. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(“Lone Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery orders designed to handle the complex issues and 
potential burdens on defendants and the court in mass tort litigation by requiring plaintiffs to 
produce some evidence to support a credible claim.”). In Exxon Mobil, the court affirmed a 
denial of class certification in a suit involving a chemical-plant fire because the plaintiffs’ 
affidavits failed to show that formulaic calculations could be applied broadly enough to satisfy 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements. Id. at 
604–05. 
 168. The technique is named for its use in Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 
WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. Nov. 18, 1986). Such orders may require plaintiffs to 
present expert affidavits estimating the severity of their injuries. Steering Comm., 461 F.3d at 
604 n.2. 
 169. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 
(W.D. Pa. 2012); see also Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming a grant of summary judgment because 1600 plaintiffs in a PAA suit failed to present 
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Pine orders force them to proffer information reserved for discovery 
at the pleading stage,170 whereas defendants claim that detailed 
exposure information should be considered essential to bringing a 
PAA claim in the first place.171 
C. The Preponderance Rule and Individualistic Evidence 
Rather than relying solely on statistical evidence, some courts 
appear to operate under the belief that jurors, endowed with an 
ability approaching divination, can identify whether and which 
individuals were harmed by their exposures to the defendants’ 
radioactive emissions. In such suits, Plaintiff A might be able to prove 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence with a doctor’s 
testimony that a “differential diagnosis” eliminates all alternative 
sources of cancer.172 That is, Plaintiff A could prevail by 
demonstrating to the jury that he was the improbable individual 
whose cancer was caused by the defendant.173 For example, in the 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation cases, in which the Ninth Circuit 
addressed whether Washington residents were exposed to 
radionuclides emitted from the world’s first large-scale plutonium-
manufacturing facility,174 the court concluded that it was inappropriate 
for the trial court to require statistical proof of a greater-than-50-
percent probability of causation because certain “individualized 
factors, such as heredity . . . might raise the likelihood of contraction 
of cancer at lower levels of exposure.”175 The court suggested that 
although epidemiological statistics from exposed populations might 
 
adequate, individualized information regarding the nature, circumstances, and attribution of 
their injuries). 
 170. See, e.g., Acuna, 200 F.3d at 340 (“Plaintiffs contend that the pre-discovery orders 
requiring expert support for the details of each plaintiff’s claim imposed too high a burden for 
that stage of litigation.”). 
 171. See id. at 340–41 (“The scheduling orders issued below essentially required that 
information which plaintiffs should have had before filing their claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 11(b)(3).”). 
 172. See Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1999) 
(“Differential diagnosis is a methodology used to determine causation of a disease suffered by 
an individual, based on efforts to consider and exclude all possible alternate causes.”). 
 173. See, e.g., id. (permitting plaintiffs’ experts to prove specific causation by ruling out 
alternate causes through differential diagnosis in spite of defendants’ objections that no specific 
radiation doses were alleged). 
 174. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1126–28 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 175. Id. at 1137. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the lower court had erred by addressing 
the question of epidemiology statistics at the general-causation phase rather than at the specific-
causation phase. Id. at 1134–35. 
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be insufficient to demonstrate that the defendants caused plaintiffs’ 
cancers, individualized forms of proof could conclusively demonstrate 
that the defendants caused certain instances of plaintiffs’ cancers but 
not others.176 
Arguably, some jurors may find a doctor’s specific testimony 
about the source of a plaintiff’s cancer to be persuasive. Furthermore, 
they may have greater confidence in the resulting judicial decision 
because they perceive that the judicial system’s role is to determine 
conclusively whether a defendant is the legal cause of a plaintiff’s 
injury.177 Expectations of certainty from simpler tort cases, such as car 
accidents, may carry over into the mass-tort realm, particularly when 
ensconced in the confidence of a medical professional.178 The notion 
that a doctor can conclusively attribute a cancer to a particular cause 
through differential diagnosis, however, has been soundly 
debunked.179 In public liability suits, clinical assessments are helpful 
only in the sense that they inform the statistical likelihood that 
plaintiffs contracted cancer from a particular source. As the Third 
Circuit observed in the TMI cases: 
[M]edical evaluation, by itself, can neither prove nor disprove that a 
specific malignancy was caused by a specific radiation exposure. 
Therefore, the primary basis to link specific cancers with specific 
radiation exposures is data that has been collected regarding the 
increased frequency of malignancies following exposure to ionizing 
radiation. In other words, causation can only be established (if at all) 
 
 176. See In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing cases from various 
circuits employing non-epidemiological evidence to establish causation). Berg was decided the 
same day as Hanford, and consisted of claims by plaintiffs severed from its companion case. Id. 
at 1129. 
 177. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 873 (hypothesizing that courts’ demands for 
particularized evidence might “buttress the system’s legitimacy by promoting a public 
perception that verdicts are based on more than probabilities” and “reinforce the image of a 
neutral, nonpolitical, and nonredistributional system”). 
 178. See id. at 872 (suggesting that the preference for individualized rather than broader 
statistical evidence indicates courts’ “desire that judgments in mass tort cases rest upon a higher 
degree of certainty about the causal connection than they normally do in sporadic accident 
cases”). 
 179. See id. at 869 (“The short answer to the demand for ‘particularistic’ evidence of 
causation in mass exposure cases is that no such evidence can be produced.”); id. at 870 (“The 
concept of ‘particularistic’ evidence suggests that there exists a form of proof that can provide 
direct and actual knowledge of the causal relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct 
and the plaintiff’s injury. ‘Particularistic’ evidence, however, is in fact no less probabilistic than 
is the statistical evidence that courts purport to shun . . . .”). 
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from epidemiological studies of populations exposed to ionizing 
radiation.180 
Radiation-protection scientists are in agreement that differential 
diagnosis cannot confidently identify the ultimate source of a 
plaintiff’s cancer. For example, the National Council on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements (NCRP)181 has concluded that 
[i]n the absence of biological markers of radiation it is generally not 
possible to make [a causation] determination with a high level of 
confidence since cancers may, and do, occur in the absence of 
exposure to a particular carcinogen of interest, including ionizing 
radiation, and, conversely, may and do fail to occur in the presence 
of exposure.182 
The Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation 
(BEIR)183 similarly recommends the use of purely statistical, 
probability-of-causation assessments.184 Combined publications of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)185 and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommend probabilistic models for 
identifying causes of radiation exposure.186 The probability-of-
causation approach is also consistent with the Federal Judicial 
Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,187 subject to certain 
 
 180. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 643 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 
 181. The NCRP is a private radiation-protection and health-science organization chartered 
by Congress in 1964. About NCRP, NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROT. & MEASUREMENTS, 
http://www.ncrponline.org/AboutNCRP/About_NCRP.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 182. NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROT. & MEASUREMENTS, NCRP REPORT NO. 171: 
UNCERTAINTIES IN THE ESTIMATION OF RADIATION RISKS AND PROBABILITY OF DISEASE 
CAUSATION 194 (2012). 
 183. BEIR is a committee of the United States National Research Council that provides 
information to the government regarding the effects of ionizing radiation. NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 163, at vii. 
 184. Id. at 265. 
 185. The IAEA is an independent international organization affiliated with the United 
Nations that fosters cooperation in the nuclear field. About the IAEA: The “Atoms for Peace 
Agency,” INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 186. INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, APPROACHES TO ATTRIBUTION OF DETRIMENTAL 
HEALTH EFFECTS TO OCCUPATIONAL IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSURE AND THEIR 
APPLICATION IN COMPENSATION PROGRAMMES FOR CANCER 11 (2010). 
 187. See Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 611–16 (3d ed. 2011) 
(describing the role of epidemiological evidence in the courtroom). 
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caveats.188 The Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear 
Accidents, established to make recommendations for improving the 
PAA’s compensation methodology for a large-scale nuclear event,189 
considered the probability-of-causation approach “the best available 
proxy for direct proof of . . . causation.”190 
Ultimately, permitting reliance on differential diagnoses 
artificially strengthens those cases in which plaintiffs lack the 
epidemiological evidence necessary to demonstrate that the 
defendant’s emissions created a measurably increased risk of harm. 
For example, in the TMI litigation, the cost of adjudicating and 
settling plaintiffs’ claims for economic and physical injuries exceeded 
$70 million,191 though the President’s Commission on the Accident at 
Three Mile Island concluded that no civilian radiation exposures were 
expected to have any health effects.192 In Cook v. Rockwell 
International Corp.,193 a jury awarded nearly $1 billion in punitive and 
compensatory damages194 on the basis of evidence that radionuclide 
releases from a government-operated nuclear-weapons plant posed a 
“small and unquantifiable” risk of harm.195 Overall, permitting public 
liability suits under the PAA to proceed on the theory that a jury can 
identify who has and who has not been harmed is not only 
unscientific, but poses a serious danger to the viability of the nuclear-
power industry after a significant incident. 
IV.  MODERNIZING CAUSATION IN PUBLIC LIABILITY SUITS 
This Note proposes that the failings of traditional preponderance 
rules require changes to the substantive law governing radiation-
injury torts under the PAA. Although other proposals may be 
imagined, torts scholars and governmental agencies addressing 
 
 188. The use of epidemiological evidence is subject to factors such as the validity of the 
study, similarity between the studied group and the plaintiff, whether exposure accelerates pre-
existing conditions, and whether the toxic agent operates independently of other causes. Id. at 
612–15. 
 189. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
1. 
 190. Id. at 101. 
 191. The Price-Anderson Act: Background Information, AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf. 
 192. See KEMENY ET AL., supra note 75, at 12, 34 (finding that the expected increase in 
cancer rates will be either zero or undetectable).  
 193. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 194. COOK V. ROCKWELL INT’L CORP., supra note 93, at 1. 
 195. Cook, 618 F.3d at 1134. 
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analogous issues in the context of other mass torts have often focused 
on one of two potential solutions: subsuming the tort claims into an 
administrative framework or modifying the burden of proof required 
for an actionable injury. 
A. Conversion to an Administrative Process 
To resolve the cost, complexity, and unfairness of using 
traditional tort principles in mass-tort cases, some scholars advocate a 
transition to administrative compensation regimes.196 Given that the 
court-applied law of causation is more amenable to simple, two-party 
torts, proposals to shift to administrative compensation regimes 
suggest that mass torts would benefit from the simplicity and speed 
associated with successful twentieth-century policies such as workers’ 
compensation and no-fault insurance.197 Such an approach is 
especially applicable to judges and juries hard-pressed for the time 
and understanding necessary to absorb scientific doctrines regarding 
the cause of an injury198 or the intricacies of nuclear-power 
regulation.199 In theory, cases that require comprehension of complex 
radiological principles might be better resolved by an administrative 
system than by a legal factfinder.200 
In the past, administrative schemes created for compensating the 
victims of the September 11 attacks, children harmed by defective 
 
 196. See generally Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a 
Permanent Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 663 (2006) (proposing a permanent, no-fault compensation scheme for domestic victims 
of terrorist attacks); Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue & Michael S. Zamore, Smokers’ 
Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 519 (1998) (suggesting a national “Smokers’ Compensation” fund); Linda S. Mullenix & 
Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to 
Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121 (2002) (contrasting the idiosyncrasies of 
the September 11th fund with those of other major administrative regimes and suggesting that 
effective compensation systems are highly tort-specific); Rabin, supra note 102 (addressing 
issues that would arise in creating an administrative compensation scheme for all mass torts). 
 197. Rabin, supra note 102, at 970. 
 198. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 926 (“Given that judges usually lack expertise in 
using and evaluating scientific information, their retention of the preponderance rule . . . in mass 
exposure cases raising complex medical and epidemiological issues may be a subtle admission of 
institutional incompetence.”). 
 199. Cf. Yellin, supra note 22, at 494–97 (arguing for scientific experts to review nuclear-
power regulations because “[n]uclear power cases . . . involve risks flowing from a technology 
whose environmental implications are not yet fully understood, thus raising matters of 
technological and scientific prediction with which the judiciary has generally been 
uncomfortable”). 
 200. Id. 
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vaccines, and injured dockworkers have successfully accelerated 
recovery for nationwide incidents that might otherwise have 
languished in the court system for years.201 The mass torts that would 
most benefit from an administrative compensation regime tend to 
share characteristics making them amenable to nonjudicial resolution. 
Often, such mass torts result from a single discrete, compensable 
event, involve a large number of plaintiffs who bear a similar injury, 
and are easily traceable to the defendant in question.202 
Another argument in favor of an administrative compensation 
regime for injuries sustained as the result of nuclear-power 
production is that Congress has already evinced a preference for 
supporting employees at nuclear facilities through similar 
compensation funds. For example, the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA)203 
created a no-fault compensation fund for DOE employees engaged in 
weapons production and testing.204 Former employees receive 
$150,000 and medical benefits if the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) determines that their 
cancers are “at least as likely as not” due to the employee’s 
occupational exposure.205 For “[s]pecial [e]xposure [c]ohort[s]” at 
certain facilities, it is unnecessary to prove causation at all.206 
Similarly, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 
(RECA)207 establishes an administrative process for compensating 
those formerly employed in uranium mines and those present onsite 
or downwind of nuclear-test sites.208 RECA provides a cheap and 
efficient alternative to litigation, rendering proof of causation 
 
 201. Mullenix, supra note 196, at 123–38, 141–43. 
 202. Rabin, supra note 102, at 964–65. 
 203. Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
398, 114 Stat. 1654 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384–7385s-15). 
 204. Radiation Dose Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), The Act 
(EEOICPA), NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
ocas/faqsact.html (last updated May 11, 2010). 
 205. Id. 
 206. JOSEPH FALCO, ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION 
PROGRAM (EEOICPA) 7 (2011), available at http://www.bnl.gov/community/cac/docs/
CAC_11_11_Falco.pdf. 
 207. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2012). 
 208. Id. § 2210 note (establishing a trust fund as well as an administrative-claims-submission 
process with judicial review in the district courts); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
RADIATION EXPOSURE COMPENSATION: ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE’S PROGRAM 
ADMINISTRATION, at 4 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232669.pdf. 
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unnecessary, and requiring instead that an individual be shown to 
have worked or resided in a designated area.209 
In 1990, the Presidential Commission explicitly considered 
whether administrative procedures might be superior to judicial 
processes in compensating claimants in the event of a major nuclear 
incident.210 The committee found several benefits to adopting 
administrative procedures, including that an agency-administered 
scheme would accelerate compensation, conserve judicial resources, 
and limit the use of experts to resolving technical questions of nuclear 
science and medicine.211 This approach would avoid repeated 
deliberations over the same scientific questions across jurisdictions, 
and its scope could be expanded or constricted as necessary.212 Indeed, 
the PAA already bears certain characteristics of such an 
administrative mechanism,213 permitting a no-fault approach in the 
event of an ENO,214 and distributing compensation from a shared, but 
limited, insurance pool.215 
However, in line with the findings of the Presidential 
Commission, it is difficult to conclude that enacting a rigid 
administrative compensation scheme under the PAA would be wise. 
Concerned citizens, a nuclear-industry lobbyist, a prominent torts 
scholar, and a major judicial figure in the history of mass-tort 
litigation all advised the Presidential Commission that the lack of 
public accountability and visibility inherent in any administrative 
mechanism would strain its credibility in the event of a major nuclear 
incident.216 In contrast, judicial procedures endow litigants with their 
“day in court,” and can be flexibly adapted to the unique 
 
 209. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 210. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
34. 
 211. Id. at 34–35. 
 212. Id. at 35. 
 213. Rabin, supra note 102, at 955–58. 
 214. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (2006) (authorizing indemnity agreements requiring nuclear 
operators to waive “any issue or defense” relating to their conduct or fault in the event of an 
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”). 
 215. See id. § 2210(a) (requiring the purchase of primary and secondary financial protection 
from a nuclear insurer). 
 216. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 35 nn.9–10 (recording the testimony of Public Citizen Congress Watch representative Pamela 
Gilbert, lobbyist Daniel Berger, Professor Robert Rabin, and Judge Jack Weinstein). 
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circumstances giving rise to a nuclear incident.217 Even if an 
administrative mechanism would be appropriate, it is unclear whether 
it would be constitutional218—for example, it might violate injured 
plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.219 Ultimately, the 
characteristics that render certain mass torts suitable for 
administrative compensation are absent from radiation-related 
injuries, which vary significantly in form, may derive from non-
tortious sources, and are difficult to trace to a particular defendant.220  
B. Judicial Procedures Utilizing “Risk-Based” Causation 
Recognizing the distorting effect of traditional notions of 
causation, some scholars recommend continued judicial involvement 
in mass-tort suits, but suggest that the preponderance rule should be 
replaced with a “proportional liability” approach.221 Rather than fully 
compensating all plaintiffs with a greater-than-50-percent chance of 
proving causation and offering no compensation below that 
threshold, a proportional liability rule compensates plaintiffs in direct 
proportion to the excess risk of injury imposed by the defendant’s 
activities.222 Such a rule appears particularly well suited for public 
liability cases, in which the ultimate “identity” of an injury is 
 
 217. Id. at 36. 
 218. The PAA previously survived due-process and equal-protection challenges when its 
compensation limits were found not to be arbitrary or irrational, but rather a “classic example of 
an economic regulation” designed to incentivize growth in the nuclear industry. Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978). 
 219. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989) (“Congress’ power to 
block application of the Seventh Amendment to a cause of action has limits. Congress may only 
deny trials by jury in actions at law, we said, in cases where ‘public rights’ are litigated: . . . e.g., 
where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute 
creating enforceable public rights.”). 
 220. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 221. See, e.g., Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New 
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 281 (1960) (proposing a contribution to a 
“contingent injury fund” in proportion to the increased risk of latent diseases from radiation 
exposure); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 859 (advocating the use of aggregative judicial 
procedures and proportional liability in mass-tort cases); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over 
Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 589 (1985) (arguing that 
imposing liability in proportion to the probability of causation encourages desirable social 
behavior). 
 222. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 859. 
O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  6:37 PM 
2014] APPLYING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 365 
biologically inseparable from the increased risk caused by the 
defendant.223 
The aims of the tort system are better served by tying damages in 
public liability suits to the proportional-liability standard. From a 
rights-based perspective, compensation should seek to provide 
“corrective justice” to plaintiffs by protecting their entitlements from 
violations by others.224 Because the tort system normally provides only 
retrospective compensation, monetary damages are equivalent to a 
forced sale of the claimants’ entitlements.225 By contrast, tying 
recovery to an individual’s increased risk of harm provides a 
contemporary measurement of the damage imposed by defendants, 
and would even permit courts to intervene before a claimant suffers 
bodily injury.226 In terms of maximizing utility, the proportional-
liability rule deters defendants to the degree of increased risk of harm 
they impose on the public.227 Although the proportional-liability rule 
breaks with tradition by compensating for risk rather than injury, the 
approach not only parallels the total damages imposed on plaintiffs 
by increased cancer incidence, but lowers the defendant’s risk of a 
disproportionately large judgment by preventing plaintiffs from being 
overcompensated—as they may be under the current system of all-or-
nothing judgments.228 
A proportional-liability rule would address plaintiffs’ chances of 
developing cancer by imposing costs based on their total increase in 
risk, even in the absence of conclusive proof of specific causation.229 
Although such an approach provides a more accurate assessment of 
the defendant’s fault,230 any implementation that compensates 
 
 223. See Estep, supra note 221, at 269 (observing that radiation is not amenable to “normal 
proof rules” because it “only increases the incidence of such injuries in an exposed group”); id. 
at 281 (proposing proportional liability for radiation-related injuries). 
 224. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 877. 
 225. Id. at 878. 
 226. For a discussion of measures that might eliminate or mitigate harm to plaintiffs’ 
entitlements before cancer develops, see infra notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 883–84 (“Unlike the preponderance rule, 
proportional liability never holds a defendant responsible for more or less than the loss the 
defendant wrongfully caused.”). 
 228. Because proportional-liability regimes may hold a defendant liable for all degrees of 
increased risk, other limitations—such as a minimum risk-of-injury threshold or fault standard—
are necessary to prevent suit by all individuals with a marginally increased chance of being 
harmed. See infra Part V. 
 229. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).  
 230. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 884 (“Because it represents an actuarial average, the 
excess risk accurately expresses the peril to the entire population . . . .”). 
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individual plaintiffs for increased risk could also increase the 
attendant transaction costs of litigation by incentivizing suits that 
would otherwise not be brought, awarding compensation to parties 
exposed to negligibly increased risks of harm.231 To prevent low-risk 
plaintiffs from receiving a windfall, practical implementations of 
proportional liability would require reducing a plaintiff’s total 
recovery as the probability that the defendant caused his cancer 
decreases and possibly aggregating his recovery with that of other 
plaintiffs to fund socially beneficial programs.232  
Moreover, proportional liability is not merely a theoretical 
construct, but a causation methodology with existing support from the 
judiciary and the Presidential Commission. For example, in assessing 
the fairness of the famous Agent Orange Settlement, Judge Jack 
Weinstein recommended applying proportional liability to avoid 
denying recovery class wide when statistical evidence indicated that 
some of the plaintiffs’ injuries must have been caused by the 
defendants.233 In 1990, the Presidential Commission specifically 
recommended that Congress amend the PAA to implement 
proportional liability.234 The Presidential Commission proposed that 
public liability suits would first trigger offsite assessments of the 
estimated radiation doses to which the public was allegedly 
exposed.235 Plaintiffs would then be fully compensated if the 
 
 231. See id. at 866 n.65 (“As long as liability remains an all-or-nothing proposition, lowering 
the threshold can only exacerbate the danger of overdeterrence.”). 
 232. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 837 (suggesting 9 percent of the amount of full 
compensation is owed for a 9 percent increase in the risk of injury); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON 
CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 107–08 (rejecting a proposal to 
provide some compensation to all cancer claimants in favor of compensating only those claims 
with sufficiently high likelihoods of causation, and paying lesser amounts to claims with 
relatively lower likelihoods of causation). For a discussion of the purpose of cumulating 
plaintiffs’ recoveries, see infra notes 262–66.  
 233. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 837–38, 842 (offering a solution in a class action to 
try all of the plaintiffs’ claims together and hold the defendant “liable to each exposed plaintiff 
for a pro rata share of that plaintiff’s injuries”). 
 234. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
101. 
 235. Id. at 103. Because “dose reconstruction” assessments occur during discovery, they are 
generally factual contests between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts regarding each claimant’s 
total exposure. See, e.g., McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. 
Supp. 2d 347, 365 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (granting a Daubert motion to exclude plaintiffs’ dose-
reconstruction expert); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 997–98, 1014 
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the DOE’s “Dose Reconstruction Project” to assess the total 
radiation exposure surrounding Hanford might have been “biased” by the litigation, but that 
plaintiffs stipulated to its accuracy). A better approach might be to require both parties to 
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probability that their cancers were caused by the incident exceeded 50 
percent, and compensated at diminishing amounts down to a floor of 
20 percent, below which no compensation would be due.236 Among 
other reasons, the Presidential Commission considered a 
proportional-liability rule appealing because it had already funded 
epidemiological “summary tables” used to assess the excess risk 
attributable to specific levels of radiation exposure.237 Today, NIOSH 
still maintains web-based variants of these tables to calculate the 
likely increased risk of developing cancer for DOE employees and 
contractors exposed to varying levels of radiation.238 
Although recovery in direct proportion to increased risk 
provides a more accurate measure of a defendant’s liability than the 
preponderance rule, the effectiveness of compensating for “risk” 
rather than “injury” can be reduced by two opposing litigation 
strategies.239 First, if fewer than all exposed plaintiffs sue, proportional 
liability will not adequately deter nuclear licensees.240 Defendants pay 
no more in damages when unmeritorious plaintiffs bring claims, yet 
 
comply with the assessment of a neutral third party, subject to independent oversight. See 
COMM. ON AN ASSESSMENT OF CDC RADIATION STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A 
REVIEW OF THE RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS CORPORATION’S FERNALD DOSE 
RECONSTRUCTION REPORT (1997) (disclosing the National Research Council’s review of dose 
assessments performed by a private third-party corporation pursuant to a memorandum of 
understanding signed by the defendant DOE). 
 236. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
108. Although the Commission also advanced a proposal to fully compensate nearby cancer 
claimants who could show an increased risk of injury of 20 percent or more, it felt that the 
proposal suffered from the same flaws as the undesirable alternative of full compensation to all 
nearby cancer claimants. Id. at 107–08. 
 237. Id. at 109. 
 238. See Interactive Radioepidemiological Computer Program (ICRP), NAT’L CANCER 
INST., http://dceg.cancer.gov/tools/analysis/ircp (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 239. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 881 (observing that proportional liability 
radically alters traditional causation rules and may confer windfalls on uninjured plaintiffs). For 
a criticism of the proportional-liability approach from the era of the Presidential Commission’s 
proposal, see generally Louis A. Cox, Jr. & Joseph R. Fiksel, A Critical Review of the 
Probability of Causation Method, in THE PRICE-ANDERSON LAW: REPORTS ON PRICE-
ANDERSON ISSUES (ANI/MAELU ed., 1985). 
 240. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 919 (emphasizing that the long latency period from 
exposure to injury leads disease victims to sue at different times, which may “substantially 
frustrate the system’s deterrence and compensation objectives”). Deterrence could also be 
achieved by plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, which are permitted by the PAA if authorized 
by state law, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258–59 (1984), as long as the 
government is not required to indemnify the defendant, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2012). But punitive 
damages, aimed exclusively at “retribution and deterrence,” may—subject to due-process 
limitations—exceed and therefore overcompensate plaintiffs for merely potential injuries. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2003). 
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they inevitably pay less in damages if some class of exposed 
claimants—such as those who have not yet developed cancer—fails to 
sue.241 Second, without some minimum standard of exposure below 
which plaintiffs cannot sue, enterprising attorneys may be 
incentivized to bring large class actions consisting of plaintiffs with de 
minimis exposure in order to vex defendants or extract a settlement.242 
Thus, although proportional-liability theory is sound, one important 
consideration is whether the PAA can accommodate any changes 
necessary to ensure its success in practice. 
V.  IMPLEMENTING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: 
ROADBLOCKS AND SOLUTIONS 
Since their inception, public liability suits have relied on the 
traditional preponderance rule of causation taken from state tort 
law.243 Because the PAA was enacted and amended with this 
limitation in mind, two changes may be required to address the 
practical success of a proportional-liability rule. First, in order to 
impose sufficient deterrence costs on defendants, plaintiffs must be 
able to sue for their increased risk of injury before they develop 
cancer. Consistent application of this rule would require resolution of 
an ongoing dispute in the federal courts of appeals regarding the 
availability in public liability suits of medical-monitoring claims, 
which can be cast as “future” injuries. Second, in order to avoid 
excessive costs to defendants, a minimum exposure threshold must be 
set below which plaintiffs cannot sue. Although such a threshold 
currently exists in the form of NRC-created exposure regulations for 
the public, such regulations are not always binding in PAA suits, and 
in any event, are set significantly below levels at which increased 
cancer rates would be expected. 
 
 241. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 884–85 (“The proportionality rule simply holds the 
defendant liable for no more (and no less) than the disease losses it has caused in the ‘body’ of 
the exposed population. The defendant never overpays, and the population as a whole gains no 
windfall.”). For a discussion of how courts might permit each party subjected to excess risk to 
sue by allowing claims for “future” injuries, see infra Part V.A. 
 242. See id. at 892 (raising, but rejecting, concerns that endorsing a proportional-liability 
rule “would enable mass exposure suits to enter the system in far greater numbers and flood the 
courts with petty and spurious claims”). For a discussion of how to prevent overdeterring 
defendants in suits for low-level emissions, see infra Part V.B. 
 243. See supra Part I.B. 
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A. Imposing Sufficient Deterrence Costs on Defendants: Permitting 
Suit for Future Injuries 
Compensating only those plaintiffs who have developed cancer 
does not address the risk that others in the community will develop 
cancer in the future.244 To prevent public liability cases from 
systematically undercompensating those harmed by the nuclear-
power-production industry, it must be possible for all individuals 
likely to be harmed to be able to sue before their harms are realized. 
In previous cases, public liability claimants have explored the 
possibility of recovering for their increased risk of contracting cancer 
by classifying their injuries as subcellular damage,245 emotional 
distress,246 or an ongoing need for medical monitoring.247 
At the moment, federal courts diverge on whether public liability 
suits permit awards for radiation exposure alone. Although Congress 
did not use phrases such as “medical monitoring” or “cellular 
damage,” the PAA appears to limit plaintiffs to suing for property 
damage and “bodily injury.”248 Generally, claims for increased risks of 
harm were not compensated at common law,249 and courts have 
tended to interpret the PAA’s “bodily injury” language as a sign that 
Congress also intended to prohibit suits for personal injury until the 
onset of cancers.250 Although other courts have concluded that 
 
 244. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 245. Compare Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 569–71 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(denying that subcellular damage is a redressable harm under the PAA), with Rainer v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 618, 622 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the PAA defers the issue 
of recovery for subcellular damage to state law, and that Kentucky law precludes recovery). 
 246. Compare Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., Inc., 528 F.3d 681, 683–84 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding that recovery for emotional-distress claims in the absence of physical injury is 
inconsistent with the PAA), with Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 
(D.N.M. 2005) (holding that recovery for emotional-distress claims is not inconsistent with the 
PAA). 
 247. Compare In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding that recovery for medical-monitoring claims in the absence of physical injury is 
inconsistent with the PAA), with Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(implicitly permitting medical-monitoring claims to proceed). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (2012) (defining a “nuclear incident” as an event that causes 
“bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of 
property” as a result of radioactive materials). 
 249. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
88.  
 250. See, e.g., In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in terms 
of recovery for increased risk of harm, medical-monitoring claims are equivalent to 
noncompensable claims for “emotional distress”); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 
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radiation exposure itself can constitute an injury under the PAA,251 
substantive state law often bars recovery. For example, in Rainer v. 
Union Carbide Corp.,252 the Sixth Circuit held that the PAA’s “bodily 
injury” requirement did not preclude recovery for increased risk of 
harm, but observed that Kentucky state law precludes plaintiffs’ 
claims absent a showing of present physical injury.253 Accordingly, any 
proportional-liability regime that relies on claimants to sue for 
increased risk of injury would, at the moment, be subject to two-fold 
uncertainty: fractured opinions interpreting the PAA in the federal 
judiciary,254 accompanied by wide divergence in tort law across the 
states.255 
To surmount this legal uncertainty, the PAA should be amended 
to permit broader recovery for radiation-related increases in cancer 
risk.256 Permitting suit by all parties exposed to increased risk of harm 
 
1248 (10th Cir. 2009) (dismissing medical-monitoring claims “because they do not assert a 
‘bodily injury,’ as required for jurisdiction under the Price-Anderson Act”).  
 251. See, e.g., Day v. NLO, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (deeming medical-
monitoring claims appropriate with an adequate showing of increased risk of injury); cf. Dodge 
v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (implicitly permitting medical-monitoring 
claims to proceed). The Fifth Circuit recently found that because the “bodily injury” language is 
used to define a “nuclear incident,” the PAA should not be read to prohibit recovery for other 
injuries once an underlying nuclear incident has been demonstrated. Cotroneo v. Shaw Env’t & 
Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 198 (5th Cir. 2011). The court “respectfully disagree[d]” that 
nonlisted harms like medical monitoring were necessarily excluded. Id. at 199 n.15. 
 252. Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 253. Id. at 618–22. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit does not consider the meaning of the 
“bodily injury” requirement to be fodder for state law. See Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. 
Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we have never relied on state 
law to interpret bodily injury. . . . The Act doesn’t call for us to apply state law in its 
interpretation . . . .”). 
 254. See Nathan White, Note, Arguments Not Raised: How the Plaintiffs’ Missed 
Opportunity Led to the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in June v. Union Carbide Corp., 2011 BYU L. 
REV. 245, 250–57 (detailing the circuit split over recovery for medical-monitoring claims under 
the PAA). Judges also disagree over whether the “bodily injury” requirement is substantive or 
merely jurisdictional. Compare Cotroneo, 639 F.3d at 200 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part) (noting 
that the “bodily injury” requirement is a threshold jurisdictional question), with In re Hanford 
Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that personal-injury 
claims in the absence of bodily injury necessarily fail to state a claim). 
 255. See supra note 253. A Sixth Circuit PAA plaintiff may sue for medical monitoring in 
the absence of physical injury in Ohio, but not in Michigan or Kentucky. See D. Scott Aberson, 
Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme 
Court Should Take when Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1114–16 
(2012) (undertaking a fifty-state survey of medical-monitoring law). 
 256. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 57 (recommending that the Presidential Commission’s changes to the PAA be enacted into 
law because judicial application of the same principles could be unconstitutional or 
inconsistent).  
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would not only provide a more precise and more predictable means 
of addressing the social harm caused by the nuclear industry,257 but 
would reduce the costs incurred by all parties. Under current law, 
public liability suits are purely ex post remedies, forcing defendants to 
wait through an unpredictable latency period before plaintiffs may 
bring suit.258 In the meantime, the responsibility for seeking cancer 
screening or treatment is left to unidentifiable and unaware claimants, 
who may suffer much greater injuries as a result. But if an entire 
community exposed to radiation has standing to sue, plaintiffs can 
secure, ex ante, the benefits of prepaid cancer screenings and 
prophylactic care.259 Nuclear insurers might also benefit from this 
approach, as early diagnoses could reduce the total compensation to 
claimants who ultimately develop cancer.260 
Although proportional liability deters defendants more 
accurately with respect to the total amount of harm caused regardless 
of who receives the compensation, making up-front payouts to each 
community member may also be viewed as undercompensating 
plaintiffs who develop cancer for their actual damages and 
overcompensating those who never develop cancer.261 Accordingly, 
proportional-liability proponents recommend that once a 
community’s increased risk of injury has been shown, a rainy-day 
fund—corresponding in size to the degree of increased risk—should 
be established and conserved to compensate future cancer victims.262 
Payouts could be made periodically as individuals developed 
radiation-induced cancers,263 and in the meantime, smaller portions of 
the fund could be used to pay for cancer screenings264 and other 
 
 257. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 258. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 88 (identifying “the problem of whether to make payments shortly after the accident because 
of the possibility of latent illnesses emerging later” as one issue of the current legal regime). 
 259. See id. at 108 (recommending the approach of permitting plaintiffs to sue for their 
increased risk of developing cancer). 
 260. Id. at 91. 
 261. Id. at 102. 
 262. See Estep, supra note 221, at 281 (arguing for a “contingent injury fund” in radiation-
related injury cases proportionate in size to the increased risk of latent disease in the 
community); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 919–20 (proposing the creation of insurance funds in 
mass-tort cases to insure against increased risks of disease). 
 263. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 920 (describing gradual insurance payouts). 
 264. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 
114. Interim medical screenings might include complete physicals for detecting various forms of 
cancer and follow-up appointments for abnormalities known to be sensitive to radiation 
exposure, such as thyroid nodules. Id. at 114 n.41. 
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prophylactic measures, ultimately reducing the defendant’s total 
liability. The funds could even provide for corrective measures to 
account for deviations from expected cancer rates, with courts 
extracting additional amounts from the nuclear-insurance pools when 
the incidence of cancer is higher than expected or returning excess 
compensation to the industry after a fixed period when fewer injuries 
materialize than were anticipated.265 Creating community-based 
compensation funds is a particularly attractive solution for radiation-
related injuries because the PAA has already established a large 
mutual-insurance pool from which compensation can be withdrawn 
and into which it can be deposited as necessary.266 
B. Avoiding Excessive Costs to Defendants: Addressing Low-Level 
Emissions 
Some concerns remain that implementing proportional liability 
in mass-tort cases might open the litigation floodgates to claims 
previously dammed up by the preponderance rule.267 Proportional 
liability discourages needless litigation because plaintiffs would 
recover little for a marginally increased risk of developing cancer, but 
the possibility remains that a potential class of sufficient size might 
nonetheless tempt unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring 
unmeritorious or weak claims to extract a settlement.268 In this 
scenario, proportional liability could be used to make the nuclear 
industry’s litigation costs more—rather than less—uncertain, 
permitting baseless claims to deplete insurance funds and deter 
investment in nuclear-power production. To eliminate this risk of 
overdeterrence, nuclear operators should not be held liable for 
minimal radiation releases. 
 
 265. See id. at 91 (“Moreover, because less harm will be sustained when disease is 
detected . . . and treated at an early stage, such a program will likely reduce the future losses 
suffered by individuals as the result of latent injury.”); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 920 (“The 
firm could endow the reserve through periodic contributions and might vary the amount of the 
reserve as more accurate information about the incidence of disease became available over 
time.”). 
 266. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring nuclear operators to participate in 
primary and secondary financial-protection insurance pools). ANI might ultimately return 
unused funds to its operators, as it does with its litigation reserves. See supra note 73 and 
accompanying text. 
 267. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 894. 
 268. See id. at 894–95 (noting that a potential increase in litigation under proportional 
liability is only feasible if previously unmarketable claims are aggregated in sufficient number to 
yield a positive return on investment).  
O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2014  6:37 PM 
2014] APPLYING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 373 
The “fault” standard for nuclear operators has received 
substantial attention in Congress.269 Although the hazardous nature of 
nuclear materials would have made the nuclear industry a prime 
candidate for strict liability, the federal government’s longstanding 
monopoly over nuclear power prevented states from creating 
coherent strict-liability doctrines as applied to nuclear activities.270 
Instead, Congress required defendants to waive all fault-based 
defenses for any event deemed to be an ENO.271 In practice, however, 
questions of fault are still commonly litigated because no nuclear 
event has been declared an ENO272—the Three Mile Island incident 
included.273 Although there is no question that strict liability applies in 
major nuclear incidents, the PAA’s fault standard is subject to state-
by-state variation274 in smaller cases that, taken together, might strain 
nuclear-insurance pools under a proportional-liability regime. 
After years without a unitary fault standard, every federal 
appellate court considering the question of the “standard of care” 
owed under the PAA has found that public liability claimants must 
plead a radioactive release in excess of NRC guidelines.275 Conceding 
that the PAA demands the use of substantive state tort law for fault, 
 
 269. See AM. ENTER. INST., RENEWAL OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT (1985) (describing 
the debates over whether the ENO provision was too high of a threshold to trigger strict 
liability, and whether the distinction was irrelevant because applicable state law would require 
strict liability anyway).  
 270. See Price-Anderson Act Amendments of 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy 
Research and Dev. of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources on S. 1225, 99th Cong. 
232–33 (1985) (statement of Ms. Van Heijenoort) (“Because of the existence of the Atomic 
Energy Act, I don’t think most States have developed law specifically on strict liability with 
respect to nuclear incidents in the nontechnical term. It may be that one could successfully 
argue that dealing with nuclear material is ultrahazardous and get a State court or a Federal 
court in applying State law to apply strict liability, but I don’t think we can assume the courts 
necessarily do that right now.”).  
 271. For further discussion of the ENO standard, see supra Part I.B. 
 272. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc. No. 97-CV-1554 DT, 2005 WL 6035255, at *37 n.46 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2005) (“No ENO has been declared by the NRC or the United States to 
date . . . .”). 
 273. Three Mile Island, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,590, 27,591 (Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Apr. 23, 
1980).  
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012) (deferring the PAA’s “substantive rules for decision” to 
state law).  
 275. E.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998); O’Conner v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1100 (7th Cir. 1994); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 
II, 940 F.2d 832, 859 (3d Cir. 1991). Some district courts in other circuits have come to the same 
conclusion. E.g., Bohrmann v. Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F. Supp. 211, 220 (D. Me. 
1996); Corcoran v. N.Y. Power Auth., 935 F. Supp. 376, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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these courts276 concluded, relying on the AEA’s preemption of 
nuclear-safety regulation, that state judges would look to federal 
regulations to decide the standard of care anyway.277 Accordingly, 
plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s conduct could have exposed 
them to some level of radiation at which defendants could be 
sanctioned by the NRC.278 
Although the consistency achieved among most circuits is 
heartening, it is not clear that tacking the fault standard to NRC 
emissions guidelines would be an adequate bar to frivolous suits 
under a proportional-liability regime. Indeed, merely requiring a 
radiation emission to exceed “federal guidelines” may impose a 
punitively low threshold for civil liability: 
[T]he various limits in present NRC regulations . . . have been set at 
a level which is conservatively arrived at by incorporating a 
significant safety factor . . . . [A] discharge or dispersal which 
exceeds the limits in NRC regulations . . . is not one which would be 
expected to cause substantial injury or damage unless it exceeds by 
some significant multiple the appropriate regulatory limit.279 
The standards set for emissions from nuclear facilities are designed to 
allow the NRC to identify deviations from normal industry practices, 
not to assess whether any individual could be harmed as a result of 
that deviation.280 
Even more concerning, some district courts have held that the 
standard of care imposed by NRC guidelines is a regulatory 
aspiration281 for doses that are “as low as reasonably achievable” 
 
 276. Noting that the PAA provides that a state’s duty of care might not be “inconsistent” 
with the terms of the PAA, the Tenth Circuit questioned whether Colorado tort law was 
necessarily preempted by federal safety standards at the time of the allegedly tortious conduct. 
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010). On remand, the court found 
that state tort-law claims for radiation-related injuries are implicitly preempted by the PAA’s 
statutory framework. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 90-cv-001818-JLK, Nuclear Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,747, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2014) (“A failed PAA claim based on an alleged 
nuclear incident is simply a failed claim, not a state-law claim in waiting.”).  
 277. See supra note 275. 
 278. See, e.g., O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1105 (refusing to create inconsistent standards for 
federal nuclear-safety regulations and tort liability). 
 279. Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(1) (2007)). 
 280. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(1) (2014) (“It should be clearly understood that [these] 
criteria in no way establish or indicate that there is a specific threshold of exposure at which 
biological damage from radiation will take place.”). 
 281. Radiation Protection Programs, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(a) (2014). 
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(ALARA).282 As the Third Circuit has observed, lowering the fault 
standard to such a degree effectively gives the jury broad discretion 
over the question of the applicable standard of care, permitting a 
finding that exposing members of the public to any degree of 
radiation may be a breach of duty in tort.283 Certainly, the linear no-
threshold model suggests that even minimal radiation exposure may 
be the cause of an individual’s cancer.284 But if the infinitesimal 
radiation releases incident to a defendant’s normal operations can 
serve as a basis for imposing liability on nuclear-power plants, then no 
such facility could ever be considered to operate safely.285 
Even today, the low fault threshold enforced by most courts does 
not help prevent frivolous litigation. This failure at the fault threshold 
misses an opportunity to screen out such litigation because claims that 
cannot surmount the barrier of the NRC’s radiation-protection 
standards would also be unable to show causation.286 Although 
applying proportional liability would more accurately internalize the 
nuclear industry’s cost to society, permitting recovery for an increased 
risk of harm without a minimum-exposure standard might transform 
the PAA from a reasoned limitation on nuclear liability into an 
“unlocked cash register.”287 A unitary federal fault threshold would 
help assure the nuclear industry that the benefits of proportional 
 
 282. See McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co., 983 F. Supp. 715, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding 
that the defendant had a duty to keep radiation releases “as low as reasonably achievable”); 
Tang v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. 93-1308 GT, 1993 WL 839708, at *1, (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1993) 
(finding that defendants’ standard of care includes ALARA); Crawford v. Nat’l Lead Co., 784 
F. Supp. 439, 447 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (finding that defendants “exceeded the dose limits” set by 
applicable regulations by “violating the ‘as low as reasonably achievable’ (ALARA) 
requirement”); In re Fernald, No. C-1-85-149, 1989 WL 267040, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1989) 
(“We remain unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that ALARA is merely an ‘approach’ to 
radiation emissions, and sets no quantifiable legal standard. Rather, we conclude that 
defendants violated ALARA when and if they exposed the public . . . .”); cf. Cook v. Rockwell 
Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1151 (D. Colo. 2006) (admitting expert testimony based on the 
ALARA standard). But cf. Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 858–59 (W.D. 
Tex. 2005) (excluding expert testimony incorporating the ALARA standard). 
 283. See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Adoption of a standard as vague 
as ALARA would give no real guidance to operators and would allow juries to fix the standard 
case by case and plant by plant. An operator acting in the utmost good faith and diligence could 
still find itself liable for failing to meet such an elusive and undeterminable standard.”). 
 284. See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra Part II. 
 286. See supra Part II.  
 287. Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge 
Kozinski expressed concern that the PAA’s existing fault standards would be an inadequate bar 
to liability if plaintiffs could recover for radiation exposure alone. Id. at 570–71. 
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liability would not be washed away by waves of unmeritorious 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The science of nuclear causation—like the modern nuclear 
industry—is better measured by the risks involved than by a 
smattering of anecdotal tales, news reports, and hearsay. Just as no 
expert, judge, or jury can definitively know who has been harmed by 
radiation from the nuclear industry and who has not, so too is it 
impossible to know what the future holds for the legal regime 
governing nuclear operators in the United States. What can be said 
with certainty is that failing to take any risks, whether in building new 
power sources, spurring investments in new technology, or developing 
new legal doctrines, poses the even greater threat of failing to address 
rules that are widely acknowledged to be obsolete and inefficient. 
Although the proportional-liability approach to nuclear causation 
remains untested, its benefits cannot be realized until the country is 
prepared to take that necessary first step into the novel. 
 
